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FOREWORD 
In July 1976, Mitchell P. Kobelinski, Administrator of the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA), appointed a Task Force on Venture and 
Equity Capital for Small Business to assess the financing problems 
facing the small businessman today and to recommend solutions. The 
Task Force was made up of 15 people actively involved in managing, 
financing or advising small businesses. It is grateful for assistance 
provided by officials from the SBA, the SEC, the Treasury and Labor 
Departments, and private financial institutions. 
The Task Force met several times as a full group and more frequently 
in smaller subcommittees. Early in the discussions it became apparent 
that the scope of the study had to go beyond just the provision of venture 
capital to very small businesses, because of the interrelated nature of 
all forms of capital required by business. 
The Task Force believes the implementation of the study' s recommenda-
tions can make a vital contribution to America's free enterprise system. 
If the recommendations included in the Report are favorably acted upon 
by the Administration and the Congress, it is the opinion of the Task 
Force that critically needed new venture and equity capital will flow 
to the small business sector of our economy, which in turn will produce 
substantial increases in jobs, tax revenues and productivity . 
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SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
MADE BY THE TASK FORCE 
Tax Laws and Regulations 
Increase the corporate surtax exemption from the present level 
of $50,000 up to $100,000; 
Allow greater flexibility in depreciating t he first $200, 000 of 
assets; 
Permit investors in qualified small businesses to defer the tax 
on capital gains if the proceeds of the sale of a profitable small 
business investment are reinvested within a specified time in 
other qualified small business investments; 
-Increase the deduction against ordinary income of capital losses 
in a small business investment made under Section 1244 of the 
Internal Revenue Code from $25, 000 in annual deduction to $50, 000, 
and increase the limit on an offering from $500, 000 to $1, 000, 000 
and on issuer size from $1, 000, 000 to $2, 000, 000 in equity capital; 
Permit underwriters of the securities of smaller businesses to 
deduct a loss reserve against the risks inherent in the underwriting 
and carrying of such securities; 
Revise methods by which revenue impact of tax changes are 
estimated to reflect revenue gains from the business use of tax 
savings and the stimulus to capital formation that tax incentives 
provide. 
Small Business Administration (SBA) 
Provide that some portion of the guaranteed borrowing available 
to SBICs take the form of debt with the interest partially subsi-
dized, if the funds are used to make equity investments; 
Permit SBICs a deduction from ordinary income for loss reserves 
on both the equity and debt portions of their portfolios; 
Immediately make a substantial increase in the size standards 
for SBIC investments and also provide for either an annual revision 
of these standards or index them according to broadly accepted 
price indicators; 
~. 
SBA should require and encourage commercial banks to assume 
a larger portion of the risk in SBA loans and change its guarantee 
fee from a one-time fee of 1 % of the amount of the guaranteed 
debt to an annual fee which more nearly reflects the value and 
cost of SBA' s guarantee; 
Substantially expand SBA' s Secondary Market Program by creation 
of a "Certificate" system for the sale of SBA-guaranteed loans. 
Institutional Investors/Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
Amend ERISA to declare a policy that pension funds may invest in 
a broad spectrum of American companies within the "prudent man" 
rule and that it applies to the total portfolio rather than any individ-
ual investment. Also create a "basket" of 5% of the assets of 
any plan within which investment managers can invest according 
to standards of prudence and liquidity appropriate to higher risk 
small business investments; 
The development of professionally managed pools of capital should 
be encouraged so that pension fund managers, otherwise con-
strained by time or expertise, may participate in the investment 
in new ventures and in growing smaller companies. These special 
funds should be specifically exempted from the provisions of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940; 
In cooperation with the SEC and other regulatory bodies, exempt 
the illiquid securities of small companies from "mark-to market" 
or " fair value" accounting treatment. 
Securities Laws and Regulations (SEC) 
Increase the small offering exemption from $500, 00 to $3, 000, 000; 
Enact the limited offering exemption as proposed in the American 
Law Institute project to codify the securities laws; 
Retain and simplify Rule 146; 
Amend Rule 144 to provide that the existing quantitative limits 
apply for only a three-month period rather than a six-month period. 
In addition, change those limits to one percent of outstanding 
shares or the average weekly volume, whichever is higher instead 
of whichever is lower; 
Develop procedures under which solicitation, with appropriate 
compensation to develop a market, may be undertaken if buyers 
are provided with copies of financial data and other disclosures 
regularly filed with the SEC along with a suplemental statement 
on mode of offering, identity of underwriters, price of securities 
offered, and information needed to update the data on file with 
the SEC. 
INTRODUCTION 
Small businesses comprise 97 percent of all unincorporated and incor-
porated businesses in the United States. More than half of all business 
receipts are generated by their operations. Perhaps more important. 
they employ more than half the U.S. business work force. 
It is a matter of acute concern that, in the face of clearly emerging 
needs and the documented benefits to the United States economy, a set 
of impediments have developed that are preventing smaller businesses 
from attracting the capital without which they cannot perform their 
traditional function of infusing innovation and new competition into the 
economy. Unless these impediments are overcome, the ability of the 
economy to compete in the world and meet the needs of the American 
public will be seriously eroded. 
It is alarming that venture and expansion capital for new and· growing 
small businesses has become almost invisible in America today. 
In 1972 there were 418 underwritings for companies with a net worth 
of less than $5, 000, 000. In 1975 there were four such underwritings. 
The 19 7 2 offerings raised $ 918 million. The 197 5 offerings brought 
in $16 million. Over that same period of time, smaller offerings under 
the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC' s) Regulation A fell 
from $256 million to $49 million and many of them were unsuccessful. 
While this catastrophic decline was occurring, new money raised for all 
corporations in the public security markets increased almost 50 percent 
from $28 billion to over $41 billion. 
A public policy that discourages the public from investing approximately 
$1 billion a year of its savings in economic innovation, growth .. and 
the creation of jobs while it encourages the public to risk $17 billion 
a year in Government-sponsored lotteries, requires close and serious 
reexamination. 
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Impediments to Small Business Growth 
In this context, the Task Force sees in the American business and 
financial scene today the following characteristics: 
1. A public policy that tilts sharply towards encouraging consumption 
and discouraging savings and investment. 
2. An increasing and dangerously high ratio of debt to equity arising in 
part from artificial tax advantages extended to debt financing. 
3. Distinct impediments to raising equity and other forms of risk 
capital. 
4. Savings gravitating towards larger institutions that are discouraged 
from investing those savings in smaller and new businesses. 
5. Well-intentioned efforts to protect investors which inadvertently 
place small businesses at a disadvantage in competing for available 
funds. 
6. Attrition and concentration in the network of financial institutions 
and firms that has served our economic needs well by mobilizing 
capital. 
A recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Development 
Foundation has arresting data on the importance of new companies and 
new technologies to property and jobs in America. It compares the 
performance of six mature companies, five innovative companies, and 
five young high-technology companies. From 1969 to 1974, the average 
annual contributions of these companies in jobs and revenues shaped up 
as follows: 
Type of Companies 
Mature 
Innovative 
Young High Technology 
Sales Growth 
11. 4% 
13. 2% 
42. 5% 
Job Growth 
o. 6% 
4. 3% 
40. 7% 
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Although these young companies are not only growing faster but actually 
creating more new jobs and tax revenues than the giants of American 
industry. we see increasing impediments to this same opportunity for 
other new companies. 
Recent economic trends have caused all investors -- institutional. 
large nonfinancial companies. venture capitalists. individuals and local 
bankers - - to become more conservative in their investment policy. 
Recent legislation and regulation. however well intentioned. has added 
to that conservatism by cutting incentives to take risks. Savings and 
other financial resources. so desperately needed by small companies to 
finance their growth, have become concentrated in larger financial 
institutions. For example: 
Since 196 2. deposits in the ten largest banks have increased from 
20 to 33 percent of all deposits. 
Pension funds assets have tripled since 1962 and it is estimated 
that by 1985 more than half of all equity capital will be in the 
hands of pension fund managers. 
Mutual funds assets have doubled in the same time period. 
Institutions now account for 70 percent of the volume of trading 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
As assets have concentrated, access to them has become more difficult, 
particularly for small businesses. In the past 5 years. the number of 
registered securities broker I dealer firms has declined 3 5 percent. and 
the number of registered representatives has declined as well. The 
Task Force has found that this shrinkage qf the securities industry has 
compounded the problem of providing smaller companies with access to 
capital. Large institutional investors handling pension funds. wary of 
standards set forth in the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security 
• -t Act (ERISA). are concentrating their funds in larger companies with 
proven earnings records to avoid possible lawsuits and liabilities under 
ERISA. 
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Individual investors, once a vital source of funds for new businesses 
and liquidity for early investors, have been so hurt in recent bear 
markets that they are reluctant or unable to provide risk funds again. 
In addition, the incentive for individuals to risk capital in equities has 
been drastically reduced by a capital gains tax rate that today can run 
from 70 to 100 percent more than the maximum rate that prevailed 
as recently as 1970. 
Compliance with Government regulations - - tax returns, registration 
statements, ERISA reporting requirements, and a great variety of 
reports and surveys -- constitutes a heavy burden for the small busi-
nessman. Although highly commendable efforts to lighten this load are 
under way, the small business today is in grave danger of smothering 
under the weight -- and cost -- of repetitive paperwork. 
One of the more serious problems is t he skyrocketing cost of entering 
the public market to seek new sources of financing. An analysis of 
six of the smaller offerings made in 1976 by companies having assets 
of less than $5 million shows the average cost of registration is 
$122, 350, an automatic and, in some cases, insurmountable roadblock 
for companies interested in entering the public market. 
The Life Cycle of Growing Businesses and Its Financing 
The result of all these trends. has been to make economic growth for 
smaller companies increasingly difficult. The chart on the next page 
illustrates the stages a company must go through to achieve maturity as a 
corporate entity. 
The cycle of a business enterprise requires different types of capital 
at each stage of its life. The highly developed U.S. marketplace has 
spawned investors for each of these many stages. The result can be 
imagined as a financial pipeline along which successful companies move 
from start-up to maturity. 
If this pipeline flows smoothly, all types of investment capital can 
function. If it clogs at any point, capital dries up all along the pipeline. 
Facilitating the turnover of initial investments to more conservative 
investors is critical to unblocking the flow of initial higher risk invest-
ments in smaller businesses. In fact, the Task Force believes that 
creating better prospects of liquidity for early investors will, in itself, 
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restore the flow of equity investment in the early stages of business 
life. Hence the Task Force focused on institutional investors and the 
public ·stock market, in addition to other sources of risk capital, internal 
financing and long-term debt financing. 
Traditionally, businesses have used a mixture of internal and external 
financing for their needs. Small businesses cannot grow very fast if they 
have to finance themselves solely out of their earnings. In most cases 
external sources must provide the financing for significant growth. 
As shown on the chart, however, a hypothetical company moving through 
the system must reach a revenue level of up to $10 million before public 
financing becomes even remotely possible. Moreover, it is not until a 
busines·s reaches revenues of $25 to $40 million that all sources of public 
and private funding become, in some measure, available. 
Though Government agencies provide a great deal of assistance to small 
businesses through agencies such as the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), there are legislative limitations on this agency's programs that 
prevent them from being completely responsive to the small business-
man's needs for equity capital. Because private financial resources are 
at times unavailable, the small businessman is often faced either with 
stagnation or the sale of all or part of his company. 
In addressing the financial needs of small businesses and the imped-
iments to meeting them, it soon becomes apparent that the problem is 
different for: 
a. the many small businesses that are local in character or so 
family owned and managed that they would be unlikely to have 
or want access to the public securities markets; and 
b. those businesses that can develop so that they will need access 
to public financing. 
There are different remedies called for with respect to these two broad 
categories of smaller businesses. 
There is a cycle of financial events and opportunities into which new and 
growing businesses have to fit themselves to finance their growth and 
expansion. This cycle starts off with the ability to save and the will to 
. ' 
. 1 
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commit those savings in order to start a small business. Here, if public 
policy is to reflect the contribution new and small business can make to 
the national welfare, our tax system has to encourage necessary savings 
and the commitment of these savings to new and small businesses. 
Then, after a new business is launched, the tax system should permit it 
to generate sufficient internal capital so that a growing equity and credit 
base will enable it to meet growth requirements. This can be done with 
some deferral of tax payments; allowing small businesses greater flexi-
bility in charging , off the assets needed to do its business; and an increase 
to reflect inflation in the amounts to which small business tax treatment 
now applies. This will provide greater revenues for the Government in 
the future as small businesses use this increase in internal financing to 
provide ·additional jobs and greater taxable wages and profits. 
From among the new and small businesses that grow as a result of these 
tax revisions, a few will show a potential for generating j obs and profits 
that are sufficient to attract funds from private, public and instit.utional 
investors. These businesses should be able to compete for these funds 
on equal terms with older, larger and more established businesses. 
Savings will not be invested in these new and growing enterprises unless 
the investors can efficiently convert their investment to cash over time 
without undue penalty. The seed money needs of these innovative and 
growth-oriented businesses used to be met by knowledgeable investors 
found in towns and cities all over America. In the last fifteen years, 
a significant portion of this activity has become institutionalized and 
professionalized in enterprises having risk money together with 
experience and skill in identifying unusual business opportunities in 
technological developments and emerging needs. 
Today however, surveys of the investing activity of leading professional 
venture capitalists, having total assets estimated at $1. 7 billion and 
investing in excess of $100 million per year in venture capital situ-
ations, show an increasing proportion of their funds going to established 
companies. In 197 5 only five percent of new investments went to start-
ups of new ventures and two percent to first-round financings. 
This represents a sharp reduction from previous years. Most venture 
capital firms have adopted a policy of staying away from start-ups and 
have put their available capital in safer and more liquid investments. 
The Task Force believes this steady shift towards a more conservative 
investment policy comes from perceived difficulty in recycling invest-
ment funds as restrictions on the access of small and growing business 
to the public securities markets has become more costly and difficult. 
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COMPANIES WITHOUT ACCESS TO PUBLIC SECURITIES MARKETS 
The very small business, usually local in character, is likely to be 
launched on the personal savings of family and friends by an entrepreneur 
interested in full ownership and attracted to the prospects of financial 
reward. 
His primary financial advisor will usually be his local banker, who 
provides advice, counsel and, more importantly, short-term credit for 
his generally undercapitalized enterprise. Local bankers are likely to 
go as far as conventional economic wisdom and prudent banking standards 
permit in granting loans on the basis of confidence and character. 
Certainly the banker cannot be adequately compensated for making this 
type of loan because of the risk and servicing involved. He, and the 
entrepreneur, are taking calculated risks, .hoping for greater rewards 
-- increased deposits and profits - - in the future. 
With these loans and private resources, the entrepreneur begins his 
business with a reasonable relationship between debt and equity capital. 
If the business prospers, he approaches his banker for funds to purchase 
additional inventory or to handle his multiplying accounts receivable. He 
continually borrows short term, being fully convinced that he will have 
funds to repay within the 30-day term of the loan. The banker, pleased 
with this progress, continues to advance funds, all in short-term notes 
renewed and rewritten at regular intervals. This satisfies the bank's need 
to adjust loan interest rates quickly and to show liquidity on its books. 
As this small business grows, however, the availability of this type of 
financing fades away as its dangers emerge. Short-term indebtedness 
goes up and retained earnings are unable to grow as fast as the business. 
Paradoxically, the more profitable the business is, the worse its 
financial statement looks because of the high ratio of debt to equity. 
As internal financing becomes increasingly difficult, the entrepreneur's 
external source of financing, his banker, may begin to run into loan 
limit problems. Moreover, as more and more local banks are absorbed 
by large banks, the entrepreneur may find himself faced with a more 
impersonal and cautious branch manager, who may not want these small 
business risks. 
The entrepreneur begins to realize the value of long-term financing. He 
turns to the government for help, in most cases to the SBA. He finds 
that this agency's programs of direct and guaranteed loans, and equity 
financing through SBA-licensed Small Business Investment Companies 
(SBICs), may be able to provide necessary assistance. Yet this 
assistance, too, has its limits. 
I . 
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Tax Revisions to Facilitate Internal Financing and Attract Capital 
The fact is that for those businesses not likely to require or want to raise 
money from the public, capital growth needs must come from a 
combination of internal cash flow and from borrowing. To make it 
possible for many thousands of small businesses to realize their 
potential in growth and jobs, reform in the tax structure is essential. 
The most direct and effective step that can help small business is to 
bring the $50, 000 of corporation earnings now taxed at a lower rate in 
line with inflation and the escalation of risks and higher costs in starting 
and carrying on business. Consequently, the Task Force recommends the 
corporate tax rates be modified so that the first $100, 000 of corporate 
taxable income should be taxed at lower rates, as follows: 
First $50, 000 20 percent 
Second $50, 000 22 percent 
Excess over $100, 000 - 48 percent 
Allowing these small businesses to use a larger portion of their first 
$100, 000 of earnings to grow will produce additional revenue and jobs. 
The Government will benefit from additional taxes and a reduction in 
welfare and other unemployment costs in the future. 
Allowing small businesses greater flexibility in writing off the first 
$200, 000 of depreciable assets· is another step that should be taken to 
increase the internal financing that is so critical to businesses in their 
early years. 
The higher capital gains tax rate has altered the risk-reward 
relationship for investors. This is likely to have its greatest impact on 
equity investment in small businesses where capital is already scarce 
and the risk of loss is greatest. This was recognized by Congress in 
1958 with the enactment of Section 1244 of the Internal Revenue Code 
that allows limited deduction of loss in a small business investment 
against ordinary income. To reflect inflation and increased capital costs 
in new businesses, the limitations surrounding this provision should be 
increased so that deduction of $50, 000 instead of $25, 000 is permitted 
a taxpayer in any one year. The limit on issuer equity capital and size 
of the financing necessary to qualify should be increased respectively 
from $1, 000, 000 to $2, 000, 000 and from $500, 000 to $1, 000, 000. 
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The capital gains tax has become so high that it no longer serves as an 
incentive to provide long-term investment capital. Deferring that tax 
as long as these funds remain invested in small business can provide 
a major incentive to attract the individual investor back to investing in 
small companies. The Task Force recommends that investors in 
qualified small businesses should be permitted to defer the tax on capital 
gains if the proceeds of a profitable sale are reinvested in another 
qualified small business within a specified time period. There is ample 
precedent for thi~ kind of deferral in home sales, condemnations and 
retirement plan distributions. Since small businesses are potentially the 
most rapidly growing part of the equity investment spectrum, the 
ultimate tax revenues can be significantly higher, more than offsetting 
the cost of deferring revenues. 
These tax revisions will result in a reduction of some tax revenue and 
deferral of other revenue. The Task Force takes issue with the method 
currently used in the Treasury's forecasts of the revenue impact of tax 
legislation. These revenue estimates reflect only the reduction _in tax 
collections from tax revisions without any offsetting allowance for income 
which will result from retaining and using the revenue reductions in 
business activity. Nor does it reflect the stimulus to capital formation 
and economic activity which greater incentives will provide. The Task 
Force believes that a more accurate and balanced method of evaluating 
the impact of proposed changes is essential to developing sounder tax 
policy. It recommends that, at the earliest possible date, the new 
Secretary of the Treasury review the methods now used to forecast the 
revenue loss from tax changes. 
SBA Assistance in Long-Term Borrowing 
The tax rev1s10ns discussed above will allow small companies to 
generate more substantial cash flows internally and, thus, attract 
greater financing from their banks. Beyond that, if small businesses 
are to be restored to their full role in contributing to national economic 
growth and generating jobs, the financing role of SBA should be 
strengthened. Therefore, the Task Force believes it important that 
SBA programs be put on a more self-sustaining and flexible basis. 
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The SBA is to be commended for steadily shifting its emphasis from 
direct loans to the guarantee of bank financing. In this way SBA has 
increasingly utilized the more intimate knowledge of local businesses 
and local economic risks and opportunities and the greater ability to 
supervise loans which local banks almost invariably have. At the same 
time it has provided small businesses with long-term financing that 
local banks, subject as they are to the requirements of regulatory 
agencies to keep their assets liquid and maturities short, have not 
been able to provide. 
The SBA is also to be commended for helping local banks to bring 
institutional funds into small business financing by instituting its 
Secondary Market Program. Under this program, banks making SBA-
guaranteed loans can now sell them to other investors to improve the 
banks' ·liquidity and bring new funds into local financing by offering 
Government-guaranteed, good yield investments to institutional and other 
investors. Since the program's inception through September 1976 .. more 
than $406 million of these loans have been sold to investors who would 
find it difficult to lend directly to small businesses. This successful 
Secondary Markets Program should be substantially expanded. The SBA-
proposed "Certificate" system would transform the guaranteed portions 
of SBA loans into freely transferable market securities. This would 
tap additional institutional investor sources of capital_, remove bankers' 
reservations about liquidity and reduce bank examiners' concerns over 
long-term loans in banks' portfolios. In order to ensure full utilization 
of these new resources_, a comprehensive public information program 
aimed at small businessmen should be instituted. 
The Task Force believes that SBA can strengthen its ability to contribute 
to the financing needs of small business by placing its operations on a 
more business-like basis in two very important respects: 
1. Requiring and encouraging commercial banks to assume a larger 
share of the risk in the long-term financing that SBA facilitates 
through its guarantee. For example_, the SBA might require banks 
to retain 15% instead of 10% of the risk in these loans and use a 
sliding guarantee fee to induce banks to take an even larger portion 
of the risk. 
2. In extending a seven-year guarantee for a one-time fee of one 
percent SBA is not being adequately compensated. Additionally_, 
there is little or no incentive for either the borrower or the lender 
to do without the guarantee. A basic guarantee fee of one -half to 
one percent a year would still be a bargain to most small busi-
nesses. An increase in the fee would also place some limitation 
on the demand for SBA' s guarantee and more adequately offset the 
losses SBA sustains in extending its guarantee. · 
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The Task Force recognizes that these steps will increase the cost of 
SBA financing. However, the availability of financing is more important 
than such a modest increase in cost. These steps will bring SBA 
activities closer to a self-sustaining basis. This should encourage the 
Congress and the Office of Management and Budget to increase the SBA 
guaranty authority as small businesses and local banks show a readiness 
to share more of the risk and pay a more realistic price for SBA-assisted 
financing. 
Strengthening the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) 
SBICs are an important source of long-term debt financing and equity 
and venture capital for small business. 
Although SBICs provide a significant amount of pure equity financing, 
there has been a tendency for them to increase their holdings in loans 
and other debt instruments of small businesses. The major incentive 
for the creation and operation of SBICs is the availability of long-term 
Government-guaranteed loans that require very modest equity and 
provide attractive investment leverage to those supplying equity capital 
for an SBIC. 
This leverage has from time to time been increased by law. To meet 
the interest cost of these increased borrowings, SBIC investments have 
tended heavily toward interest bearing debt securities, rather than 
common stock. This has a tendency to add to the debt burdens of the 
smaller business rather than providing the permanent capital that this 
size of business so badly needs. 
To resolve this problem, the Task Force recommends that some portion 
of the Government loans providing SBIC leverage be available in the 
form of debt, on which interest is partially subsidized. This would 
relieve the pressure on SBICs cash flow and enable them to make more 
pure equity investments. 
Another disincentive for SBICs to take risk is the tax treatment of loss 
reserves. Currently, SBICs may establish a loss reserve for only 
those investments which are in the form of debt securities. The Task 
Force recommends that SBICs be authorized to deduct loss reserves 
from ordinary income on both the equity and debt portions of their 
portfolios in order to encourage more equity investments. 
SBA has partially adjusted for inflation by increasing its size standards 
for SBIC investments. However, these adjustments tend to lag behind 
the realities of the marketplace. Therefore, the Task Force recom-
mends that SBA adjust its size standards for SBICs annually or that 
these standards be measured against broadly accepted price indexes. 
- 13 -
COMPANIES SEEKING PUBLIC CAPITAL 
Small businessmen whose enterprises survive and thrive may find it 
necessary to seek external financing from investors having more 
substantial and varied capital resources than commercial banks and 
the SBA. There is a new set of obstacles on this road to economic 
growth. 
The access of small companies to public markets.. particularly in the 
.. . early 1950's .. encouraged the formation of venture capital -- money that 
was available for innovation and small business growth in the hope that 
some of the funds invested could be recovered within two to five years. 
Venture capitalists.. however.. like all investors.. found that the years 
following 1969 were difficult ones. They were forced to cut back on 
investments in many new ventures.. because without a lively secondary 
market for resale of these securities .. underwritings do not take place. 
Without underwritings.. there are no investments.. and the economy 
suffers. The table below illustrates the precipitate decline in offerings 
and money raised for companies having net worth of $5 million or less. 
Total Dollar Amount 
Year No. of Offerings (in millions) 
1969 548 $1 .. 457.7 
1970 209 . 383. 7 
1971 224 551. 5 
1972 418 918.2 
1973 69 137.5 
1974 8 13. 1 
1975 4 16. 2 
The first stages of market recovery in 197 5-1976 have not been strong 
enough to rebuild confidence .. particularly that of individual investors .. 
in the new issues market. 
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Making Institutional Funds More Available to Small Business 
Institutionalization of the stock market has meant that the small 
businessman must appeal to a professional investor who has a large 
amount of money and limited time to analyze potential investments. 
Increasingly, a major source of capital in America is the money in 
pension and other employee trusts. Fiduciary standards created by 
ERISA, however, have isolated about $200 billion of money in these 
trusts from all inyestments other than large blue chip, and fixed income 
securities. Attorneys advising trust officers have interpreted ERISA 
regulations conservatively, although they do not differ significantly from 
commonly practiced standards of fiduciary responsibility. As a result, 
trustees are reluctant to invest in companies without strong earnings 
records; Most pension trustees find it neither economic or prudent 
to invest in companies without a capitalization large enough to give 
investors liquidity. It appears that the market value of a firm must 
be over one hundred million dollars to interest pension funds managers. 
ERISA should be amended in two important respects: 
1. To expressly declare a policy of allowing pension funds to invest in 
a broad spectrum of American companies by clarifying ERISA' s 
"prudent man" standard so that it is clearly applicable to the 
total portfolio of pension fund investments rather than individual 
investments, and 
2. To relieve pension fund managers of ERISA restrictions in investing 
up to five percent of pension fund assets in companies having less 
than $25 million in net worth and larger companies having limited 
marketability for their securities. 
These modifications should be designed to encourage the development 
of professionally managed pools of capital to assume responsibility for 
segments of the portfolio that pension fund managers do not have the 
time or experience to effectively invest in new ventures and growing 
companies. The SEC should exempt these special funds from the time-
consuming and cumbersome requirements of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940. 
The current interpretation of Financial Accounting Standard Boards 
regulations has led to substantial short-term profit and loss impact 
on portfolios. These standards require portfolio managers to value these 
holdings of unregistered securities and report the resulting portfolio 
changes as profit or loss, even though no transactions take place. These 
. ' 
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fluctuations in both valuation and profit and loss are arbitrary and time 
consuming. Requiring "fair value" accounting creates the onerous task 
of frequently evaluating the current fair value of investments in small 
company securities. Most institutions avoid this by simply staying with 
only large, marketable equity securities or high quality debt securities. 
It would be consistent with the principle of materiality to waive the 
requirement for fair value accounting for investments made within the 
five percent "basket" provision we have recommended . 
Small Business Access to the Public Securities Markets 
The small businessman will find more and more securities firms 
disappearing with changes that have taken place in brokerage economics. 
Fixed commission rates have been eliminated and rates are governed 
by competitive and free market forces. Principal beneficiaries of this 
change have been institutional investors, not individual investors. 
All these forces have substantially dried up access to the securities 
markets for small businesses. There are fewer regional securities 
firms, fewer registered representatives, fewer trading desks and 
research facilities. 
Today, most underwriting is by the "majors 11 , and these "majors" will 
not generally underwrite companies with annual earnings of less than $2 
million. The few remaining strong regional brokers are working almost 
exclusively with firms whose earnings are between $1 million and $2 
million. 
To keep small firms with growth potential from being shut out of the 
public securities market the SEC created Regulation A (based on the 
small offering exemption in the Securities Act of 1933). This facilitates 
securities offerings of $500, 000 and less by exempting them from the 
costly and time- consuming undertaking of full registration. This is 
not much capital for a · growing company in the light of today's needs 
and the value of today's dollar. The Task Force commends SEC 
Chairman Roderick Hills for recommending that the Regulation A 
exemption be extended to offerings up to $2 million. However, it is 
impressed by the need for the underwriting of most Regulation A 
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offerings as shown by the SEC' s finding that, during the period 1972 
to 1974, in 546 Regulation A filings only 35% of the shares offered were 
actually sold. Since few firms in the contracted securities industry will 
underwrite an issue of less than $3, 000, 0000 today and firms which do 
handle small issues are anxious to take advantage of the savings in time 
and cost which Regulation A makes available, the Task Force believes 
the limit should be increased to $3 million. 
Congress also provided a private offering exemption in enacting the 
Securities Act of 1933. Administrative and court interpretations have· 
so narrowed the scope of this exemption that investors in very small 
financings have been able to change their minds and get their money 
back simply because the offering had not been registered. The buyer 
of stock who is defrauded has been provided with an effective remedy 
by the SEC through its development of Rule 10b(5). Requiring a small 
business to register a limited financing under pain of having to return the 
proceeds in the absence of any fraud was never intended and Congress 
should take legislative action to restore the private offering exemption. 
The SEC developed Rule 146 to provide a safe harbor for private 
offerings that claim the private offering exemption and do not register. 
The SEC is to be commended for an imaginative effort to clear up the 
difficulties created by the attrition of the statutory private offering 
exemption. However, this Rule will necessarily be cumbersome, 
complicated and burdensome until Congress acts to restore the original 
intent of the private offering exemption. Meanwhile, there are 
modifications in Rule 146 which can be helpful and the Task Force 
recommends Rule 146 be modified in two respects: 
1. In the "information to be provided" provision insert the words "if 
material" to modify the information required in the offering circular; 
and 
2. Add a provision, along the lines of that provided in Rule 240, that 
failure to furnish inform at ion or an inability to sustain the 
burden of proof with respect to other offerees will not permit 
a buyer who has been properly informed to demand recision. 
... 
. , 
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The limitations that the SEC has developed on the secondary sale of 
securities are probably more damaging to small business financing in 
the public securities markets than the high cost of registration and 
the near disappearance of the private offering exemption. If the kind 
of risk money that goes into new and growing businesses cannot be 
readily recycled it is usually not invested. It is the inability to readily 
convert some of the profits on successful investments back into cash 
that has driven professional venture capitalists away from start-ups 
towards companies with proven earning records. Furthermore, this 
leads to the liquidation of investments through large corporate takeovers 
instead of by sales in the public securities markets. 
Congress, in enacting the Securities Act of 1933, required registration 
of securities only of issuers, underwriters and dealers. Anyone else 
was to be free to sell without registration. Until the late sixties, it was 
generally considered that holding a security for two years established 
that it had not been purchased for resale as an underwriter and could 
be sold without registration. During the late sixties and early seventies, 
considerable uncertainty developed about restrictions on resale of 
securities and in 1972, the SEC issued Rule 144. 
Rule 144 has been successful in bringing clarity and certainty to the 
requirements for the resale of securities purchased without registration. 
However, it has, in the view of the Task Force, created unnecessary and 
unjustified restrictions on the private resale of unregistered shares 
which contribute substantially to clogging the flow of capital to smaller 
businesses. 
Where Rule 144 is harmful is in its effort to protect the market from 
selling pressure through quantitative limitations on the shares which 
may be sold in any six-month period. This quantitative limitation has 
a whole series of consequences that impede venture investing, are 
counterproductive to investor protection and promote concentration. 
The limitations on moving out of a risk investment cause venture 
capitalists to go in for smaller percentages and in lesser amounts . 
The restricted pace at which they are able to liquidate their investment 
contributes substantially to the trend to stay away from young companies 
and to restrict venture capital to companies which have matured or 
seem to be on the verge of maturing. When they do have a successful 
investment, the difficulty of recycling their investment through private 
sales gives an edge to the large company that can take over the smaller 
company in one bite. This, in turn, reduces competition and promotes 
concentration. 
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Moreover, as long as there are restrictions on compensation and other 
selling efforts, it is difficult to see why any quantitative limitation is 
required. The seller's interest in not driving down the price of the 
shares he wants to sell can be relied on to limit the shares he offers. 
Certainly there is no evidence to justify a limitation which extends for 
six months and there is ample evidence that the present maximum is 
usually absorbed in a matter of weeks or days, when there is any real 
market at all. 
The Task Force therefore recommends that as a first step Rule 144 
be amended so that existing quantitative limitations apply for only a 
three-month period instead of six months and that the limit be set at 
one percent of outstanding shares or the average weekly volume over 
a four-week period, whichever is higher instead of whichever is lower. 
The Task Force is pleased to learn that SEC Chairman Hills has 
initiated an economic analysis to reevaluate the need and justification 
for a quantitative limit on resales of securities that have not been 
registered. It hopes that the quantitative limit will be eliminated or 
enlarged further if economic analysis shows that there is little or no 
justification for it. 
The Task Force also recognizes that many small businesses do not 
enjoy an active market for their shares. Rule 144' s prohibition against 
solicitation requires that there be a reasonably active market in a 
security if substantial amounts are to be sold. Thus, reduction or 
removal of the limit on shares offered will be only marginally beneficial 
to investors in many small businesses because of the limitations on 
solicitation coupled with a relatively thin market. 
The Task Force therefore hopes that the $EC, and the experienced and 
knowledgeable Disclosure Committee it has designated under the 
chairmanship of A. A. Sommers, develop procedures under which 
solicitation and compensation required to develop a market wi ll be 
permitted. The Task Force believes that active selling should be 
permitted when buyers are provided with copies of the financial data 
and other disclosures · regularly filed with the Commission and a 
supplemental statement on the mode of offering, the identity of any 
brokers involved, the prices at which the securities are to be offered and 
any information necessary to update the data on file with the Commission. 
.. . 
.. 
.. 
.. 
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Acquisitions and Concentration 
The Federal Trade Commission's 1976 report on mergers and 
acquisitions states: 
"As in the previous three years, acquired firms that fell into the 
smallest asset size class accounted for the highest proportion 
of recorde~ acquisitions. Acquisitions of firms in the under $1. 0 
million and unknown asset size class represented 93 5, or 76. 1 
percent of the total number of recorded completed and pending 
acquisitions. For many of the acquired companies in this cate-
gory, asset figures were unavailable - - most likely because the 
ac·quired company was quite small. The $1. 0 - $9. 9 m i.Ilion asset 
size class had the second highest proportion of acquired companies 
(11. 5 percent)." 
As we have already developed, limitations on the ability of private 
investors in successful small businesses to sell their shares to other 
investors have resulted in large companies being able to entirely buy out 
successful small companies at a discounted price because the business 
and its individual owners have little alternative in meeting their financing 
and liquidity needs. This is, we believe, the major force increasing 
concentration and big corporation bureaucracy and diminishing 
competi ti.on in the American economy today. 
We recognize that mergers are a legitimate means of developing 
liquidity. Frequently, a growing business needs the capital and 
management expertise of a larger partner for continued growth. On 
the other hand, many mergers in the past five years have been "shotgun 
weddings" beeause of an environment that offered the small businessman 
no alternative methods of acquiring capital and liquidity. 
Recently, larger companies have begun selling and restructuring 
peripheral portions of their operations as smaller, free-standing 
businesses. Freer availability of risk capital to encourage divestitures 
of this kind can revitaiize these smaller operations and provide new. 
challenging opportunities for both technological and personal advance-
ment. It can also inject new forces of competition which will benefit 
all who participate in our economy as consumers, producers and 
investors. 
- 20 -
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION 
The recommendations of this Task Force offer only partial solutions 
to the problems of equity and venture capital for small businesses. No 
solutions remain adequate for very long. Problems multiply as society 
becomes more complex. There is a need to deal with small businesses 
problems on an ongoing basis. But there are no marble palaces in 
Washington for small business nor are there many champions whose 
voices are heeded. A Task Force such as this can only provide a snap-
shot of the conditions which its individual members experience and 
observe. It should submit its report, make its recommendations, and 
then go out of existence. Small businesses, however, need strong on-
going advocacy aimed at creating the optimum environment for their 
growth. It is the considered view of the Task Force that this role should 
be lodged in the Office of the Administrator of the SBA. 
The SBA is a small, independent Federal agency, and SBA Administrators 
until very recently did not sit as a member of the various advj sory 
bodies Presidents have used in coordinating economic policies . Yet this 
agency could be the principal voice of half of the nation's business 
community. The Task Force believes the SBA Administrator should 
be charged with an active role on behalf of small business in a number 
of areas: 
The SBA should expand its role as a catalyst and advocate within 
the government for changes reflecting the concerns of small 
businesses. These concerns are fragmented among many agencies 
and action on them often appears at random, too little or too 
late. The SBA should not only act to coordinate the Federal 
Government's activities relating to small business, but also to 
serve as an intermediary between various government units and 
private groups representing small businesses and their sources 
of financing. 
The planning and research activities of the SBA should be strength-
ened and its area of interest extended beyond its SBIC and 7(a) Bank 
Loan Guaranty program to include the general health of the public 
and venture capital market as well. These studies should be 
directed to such specific matters as the competitive impact of 
option trading on market trading in shares of smaller companies 
and its effect - - if any - - on the new issue market in these shares. 
.. 
.. 
,. 
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As a final note. the Task Force believes the government can play a vital 
role in stimulating the creation of new products that can be produced and 
marketed by small business. Too often an invention developed with 
government support has become the government's invention and not the 
inventors. Also too often. worthwhile technology developed by the 
government for special purposes such as defense or space has not been 
commercially developed. SBA' s interest in this area could stimulate 
the economy. and result in increased jobs and tax revenues. 
If small businesses are to continue as a vital force in today's economy. 
their interest and requirements must be · considered and advocated 
vigorously. The Task Force believes that the steps outlined here can 
significantly increase the contributions which these enterprises can make 
to the U.S. economy. 
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